This paper investigates the interaction among a firm's knowledge capital, growth opportunities, earning dynamics, and optimal leverage level. Under the corporate taxation and personal taxation framework, by assuming knowledge capital positively affects the realization of a firm's growth opportunities, I find a positive relation between a firm's optimal debt level and its knowledge capital. Meanwhile, I identify a negative relation between R&D investment and leverage in the presence of better measures for a firm's knowledge capital. By using the data collected for US biotech firms, I find that firms' debt ratios are indeed positively related to their knowledge capital measures: citation-weighted patent counts or claim-weighted patent counts. Furthermore, by employing an event study approach, I find a firm tends to increase its leverage after the enhancement of its knowledge capital.
Introduction
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) 's seminal work, financial economists have made great progress understanding the determinants of optimal capital structure. Now, people understand the most important departures from the Modigliani and Miller assumptions that make capital structure relevant to firm value. Despite advancement made on this topic, surprisingly small literature has ever studied the dynamics between a firm's growth opportunities and its financing structure, an emerging issue due to the birth, formation and fast growth of a series of high-tech industries in recent twenty years.
High-tech industries are distinguished from others by the three characteristics: intensive R&D investment, crucial roles played by the firm's knowledge capital, great growth opportunities.
1 There is no doubt that the factors that have been identified as important in explaining the firm's capital structure in previous studies still apply to high-tech industries to some extent. However, the features specific to high-tech firms certainly make the firms' financing choice display certain pattern, which cannot be fully explained by previous theories on capital structure. Firms, especially high-tech firms could be defined as a collection of assets in place and growth opportunities.
2 An interesting issue here is how assets in place (i.e., knowledge based assets) affect the firm's growth opportunities, which further affect the firm's financing structure.
This article aims to study the determinants of a firm's capital structure under an R&D intensive and technologically innovative environment, in which knowledge capital and growth opportunities play crucial roles. Recent evidence suggests that a firm with high knowledge capital is more likely to make technological innovations and therefore has greater growth opportunities. Growth opportunities affect the variability and permanence of a firm's cash flow stream, which in turn, influence its optimal leverage. My objective is to clarify the away investment and agency problems, it allows a more reasonable cash flow process and directly relates leverage to various measures of knowledge capital. Most importantly, it captures the effects of growth opportunities on cash flow stream and optimal leverage. In my model, I assume that the value-maximizing firm trades off the advantages and costs of debt financing. This could be conceptualized as the firm minimizing the value of the competing claims of non-owners. Under the corporate and personal tax framework, 3 the cash flow to the government either is equal to a fraction of the firm's cash flow in excess of interest payments on its debt plus non-debt tax shields, 4 or is equal to zero when the cash flow is insufficient to cover these obligations. 5 Thus the government's claim to a firm's cash flow could be treated as a European call option written on the firm's cash flows with exercise price equal to the sum of its debt and non-debt tax shields. Similarly, personal tax payments of debt-holders can be seen as an option with an exercise price equal to the firm's debt level.
Obviously, the non-owner claims to the firm's cash flow could be understood as a government option portfolio with a long position in its corporate tax option and short position in the personal tax option. At the optimal debt level, the firm equates the tax rate weighted marginal effects of the debt on the two options. The interaction among optimal debt level, the firm's growth opportunities, knowledge capital, therefore, depends upon relative magnitudes of marginal effects of debt on the two options.
In my model, I explicitly model the interaction among growth opportunities, knowledge capital, earnings, and leverage. I assume that a firm with high knowledge capital is more likely to execute its growth potentials, which in turn affects its cash flow stream. Thus, the firm's earning process follows a jump-diffusion process with its jump (exercise growth options) probability endogenously determined by its knowledge capital. Clearly, I find a way of relating a firm's knowledge capital to its growth opportunities, which is further related to the cash flow stream and to the two taxation options. Through comparative static analysis, I identify a positive relation between the firm's knowledge capital and its leverage level. This result is in contrast with most previous studies.
In order to test whether my model correctly captures the interaction among growth opportunities, knowledge capital and leverage. I used the data collected for US biotech firms to test the hypotheses derived from the model. The focus on the biotech industry allows study of the effect of knowledge capital on growth opportunities and optimal capital structure in a cross-section of different firms within a single industry. This effectively excludes the possible influences of other non-knowledge, non-industry factors on the firm's financing decisions.
By applying regressions and event study approach, I find that firms with more knowledge capital have higher debt-asset ratio; I also find that the firm have incentive to increase its leverage right after the enhancement of its knowledge capital. Empirical evidence supports the model well.
Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991) also studied optimal leverage decisions under a corporate and personal taxation framework. However, they focus on the effect of business risk on leverage. Also, they use the dispersion of earnings as a proxy for business risk, which implicitly assumes that the earning process is exogenously determined. Raymar (1991) constructs a model of capital structure when earning process is assumed to be mean-reverting.
His model is one of the first that explicitly model the firm's earning dynamics. He found that earning dynamics affect a firm's optimal capital structure. However, the earning process addressed in his study is still exogenous. Also, he fails to take into account the effects of growth opportunities on a firm's earning dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, I lay out the model and then explore the interaction among knowledge capital, growth opportunities, and optimal debt level. Section 3 provides empirical evidence of how firm-specific knowledge capital affects the level of capital structure. Section 4 studies the changes in firm leverage level as firm-specific knowledge capital stock changes. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Model
In this section, I lay out the model and then derive the firm's optimal debt level. Finally, we use numerical analysis to explore the interaction among knowledge capital, growth opportunities, and optimal leverage level.
the model setup
The first challenge I encounter is how to incorporate a firm's growth opportunities into the model. To understand this issue under real options framework, a high-tech firm owns growth options, which will be exercised whenever the firm makes innovative breakthrough. However, the exercise dates are unknown. We do not know when these growth opportunities could be materialized and have real impact on the firm's cash flows and its financing structure.
To avoid the difficulties of modeling the "put options" with unknown exercise dates, I rely on the empirical evidence that has been documented by several studies: the firm with more knowledge capital is more likely to materialize the growth potentials. 6 Specifically, I assume that a firm with more knowledge capital is more likely to materialize the growth opportunities, therefore, its cash flows follow a jump diffusion process with jump probability related to its knowledge capital.
Consider a firm in an R&D intensive and technologically innovative environment. Let X be firm-specific knowledge capital measure, 7 and I be the operating cash flow to the firm before debt, tax and depreciation. I, represents the value of cash flows generated by the firm's business activities. It is also assumed that these cash flows are spanned by the cash flows of marketed securities. Due to the innovative nature implicit in the environment, 6 See Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998), Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (1999) . 7 Note that X could be a vector, in which each element captures certain type of knowledge capital.
firm-specific knowledge capital may generate discontinuities in the firm's operating cash flows. The "discontinuities" are caused by technological innovations, scientific breakthrough, or ingenious commercialization of ideas, which successfully materialize the firm's growth opportunities. Thus, I assume that the firm's operating cash flows before tax, debts and depreciation, I, follows the following jump-diffusion process:
where σ is the risk (standard deviation) of the continuous component of the firm's cash flow; R(t) is the risk-free interest rate; dz(t) is the increment of a standard Wiener process. I also assume that the following holds:
In above model specifications, J(t) is the percentage jump size (conditional on jump occurring) that is lognormally, identically and independently distributed over time, with unconditional mean µ J . σ J measures the dispersion of jump size. q(t) is a Poisson jump counter with intensity, λ. That is, P rob(dq(t) = 1) = λdt and P rob(dq(t) = 0) = 1 − λdt.
We also assume the probability of more than one jump occurring is P rob(dq(t) ≥ 2) = •(dt),
In order to capture the effect of growth opportunities which are related to the firm's knowledge capital, I further assume that
In equation (3) the intensity of jump occurring is related to the stock of the firm's knowledge capital. An intuitive interpretation is that the firm's operating cash flows evolve continuously in most of the time. But occasionally, a "jump" occurs due to the technological breakthrough made possible by the firm's knowledge capital. The frequency or intensity of the "jump" depends on the firm's knowledge base. Note that I do not identify the difference between the jump frequency and jump size. I assume that the jump size is just a random draw from certain probability distribution. So knowledge capital only influences cash flow through the "jump" intensity, λ.
I have followed the standard practice and specify from the outset a stochastic structure of a firm's cash flow under a risk-neutral probability measure. By using this assumption, I
am able to value the firm's future risky payoff as if the economy were risk neutral. The trade off here is that we have to sacrifice some economic intuitions in the model. For example, the jump intensity, λ and jump size, µ J , in my model are not the actual jump intensity and jump size. They are jump intensity and jump size under risk neutral probability measure. In other words, they are risk adjusted jump intensity and jump size. Therefore, the magnitude and sign of λ, µ J may be counterintuitive in some situations.
I study the firm's optimal capital structure choice under the corporate tax and personal tax framework. I abstract my model from agency problem, adverse selection, and contests for corporate control. The basic approach used is similar to that in Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991) , DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), and Miller (1977) .
For simplicity, I assume that the marginal personal tax rate on capital gains is zero and let τ p and τ c be the marginal personal tax rate on debt income, and the marginal corporate tax rate, respectively. 8 Let D represent the tax-deductible debt service charge, and Π be the depreciation charge, or more broadly, non-debt tax shields.
Clearly, corporate tax collected by the government is given by:
Similarly, personal tax paid by the firm's debt holders is given by
8 Assuming the marginal personal tax rate on capital gains to be zero could simplify our model dramatically. And this is a less outrageous simplification than it looks. First, the tax rate on capital gains normally is lower. Second, the shareholders need pay no taxes on their gains until realized and only a small fraction of accumulated gains are, in fact, realized and taxed in any year. Also, taxes on capital gains can not only be deferred at the option of the holders, but also be avoided if held until death. Third, I don't model explicitly tax-timing options equityholders have in a multi-period setting. Thus, assuming personal tax rate on capital gains to be zero could reduce the errors due to this modeling simplification.
Since I assume that the marginal tax rate on capital gains is zero, the total tax collected by the government is therefore the sum of corporate tax and personal tax paid by debt holders. Let T denote the total tax liability collected by the government. I have: 
where the risk-neutral probabilities, Π 1 and Π 2 , are recovered from inverting the respective characteristic functions:
and
in which f 1 and f 2 are defined as:
Proof: See Appendix.
the optimal capital structure
Under the corporate taxation and personal taxation framework, the competing claims of nonowners of a firm could be represented as the government's tax liability defined in equation (6). As I explained before, the tax liabilities, T, could be seen as a portfolio of options.
In section 2.1, I derive the formula for the European call option given that the firm's cash flows follow a jump-diffusion process with jump intensity endogenously related to the firm's knowledge capital, X. Now, I assume that the firm's owners take an ex ante efficiency view. In other words, given investment risks, firm owners choose the optimal debt level to maximize the value of the claims to themselves. Therefore, the firm's problem is to choose the best D * , which minimizes the total tax liabilities of the firm's claimholders:
The first order condition of this problem is that, at optimal D * ∂T ∂D
when D * > 0. When D * = 0, the corresponding first order condition is
where I * doesn't appear in equations because it is a constant and is gone when taking derivative.
As explained in Section 2.1, given risk neutral probability measures, the first order conditions above could be easily represented as the following partial derivatives of the call options defined above:
where we have
This eventually gives us
Similarly, we can have
At D = D * , the following condition must hold
The key here is to find
Unfortunately, given that I have assumed the firm's operating cash flows follow the jump-diffusion process with the jump probability endogenously related to firm's knowledge capital, X, I am not able to address the above first-order conditions analytically. Nor could I simplify the assumptions in order to solve the model analytically without changing my research questions. I will check the existence and properties of optimal debt level, D * , by using numerical analysis. As I will explain later, the results I obtain from numerical analysis appear very robust.
The Numerical Analysis
The Consider that high-tech firms normally do not issue too much debt. And when they issue debt, the maturities are normally shorter. In the base model, I choose τ to be 2 years.
Also note that non-debt tax shields here include depreciation deductions, investment tax credits and so on. Under an R&D intensive environment, large part of R&D expenditures are non-taxable. Specifically, if a firm has large amount of R&D expenditures, under current tax codes, its non-debt tax shields will also be relatively large.
10 The values of jump-related parameters are chosen based on previous research (Bates (1991) ; Darby, Liu and Zucker (1999) ). The jump size and jump intensity are measured under risk-neutral probability framework. The risk premium related to jump risk has already been implicitly included in the parameters. Therefore, the size or sign of jump-related parameters might be counterintuitive.
For example, in above model, I assume the jump size, µ J to be -0.1. This is consistent with the risk neutral assumption. But it doesn't mean that the firm has a downward jump in its operating cash flows. The only correct way to understand it is that the firm has experienced a discontinuity in its operating cash flows (the firm has exercised a growth option which increases its operating incomes) and this discontinuity is caused by knowledge capital.
To illustrate the relationship between optimal debt level and knowledge capital measures, I graph the total expected tax liabilities based on equation (6) for three firms that are identical in every aspect except for their knowledge capital contents. 11 The firm with "high"
9 The jump size here is not the actual jump size, but the risk-adjusted jump size. 10 Hall and Wosinska (1999) present extensive evidence on R&D tax credit. According to their calculation, the R&D tax credit can run as high as 10% of the firm's taxable income. I believe the percentage should be even higher for high-tech firms that rely heavily on R&D expenditures.
11 Note that when I calculate the total tax liabilities based on equation (6), for the purpose of simplicity, I do not include τ p I * . This would not have any qualitative effects.
knowledge capital, H, has X = 5; the firm with "medium" knowledge capital, M, has X = 1; and the firm with "low" knowledge capital, L, has X = 0. The functions
for the firms attain a unique interior minimum at
.98. Clearly, the firm with higher knowledge capital has a higher debt level. Figure 1 graphs the firms' tax liability against different debt levels for the three firms.
To further explore the relation between knowledge capital and optimal debt level, I
calculate a firm's optimal debt levels under different knowledge capital levels. As shown in table 1, when knowledge capital measure (X) increases, the optimal debt level also increases.
There is a positive relation between theist two variables. Figure 2 graphs this relation.
As shown in table 1 and figure 2, the firm's optimal debt level increases with its knowledge capital. This is in contrast with the evidence from previous studies. Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales(1995) examine the relationship between a firm's debt ratio and its intangible assets. One of their findings is that there is a negative relation between the two variables in most cases. Jensen and Meckling (1976) have attributed this to the growth opportunities available to firm with high R&D expenditures (a proxy for intangible asset).
They argue that a firm with high growth opportunities should be cautions with the use of debt because of bankruptcy costs of debt financing. Titman (1984) explains the negative relation between a firm's R&D expenditures and leverage by relating the firm's leverage to the uniqueness of its product and whether there are specialized services required in its production process. Based on his argument, the more intangible assets the firm has, the less likely the firm will turn to debt financing. The key point of my model is that I add a jump component into the firm's earning dynamics and relate its jump intensity to the firm's knowledge capital. Ex ante, a firm's equityholders do not know whether knowledge capital will bring along additional cash flows to the firm. They do not know when a jump would occur (growth options being exercised).
But they know that a firm with more knowledge capital is more likely to execute the growth options and would execute them more often. Clearly, knowledge capital act like some type of "collateral" in my model. From this perspective, I would say that the knowledge capital, even though they are intangibles, could be "collateralized".
Under the agency theory framework, Chang (1987) finds that leverage increases with the fraction of unobservable cash flows. This looks similar to my conclusion. But my model relates the dynamics of cash flows to the growth options and firm-specific knowledge capital.
Besides, my model takes a tax-driven approach, which is totally different from the agency problem approach adopted in Chang (1987) .
To reconcile the roles played by R&D expenditure in a firm's financing decision, I decompose its effects on optimal debt level into two parts: one aims to capture the firm's knowledge capital; the other captures the firm's non-debt tax shields. The second effect capital.
could be very significant under current tax codes. Take the biotechnology firms as example, biotech firms' debt levels normally are smaller than their R&D expenditures by one magnitude order. Therefore, tax credits enjoyed by R&D investment could be very significant in explaining biotech a firm's leverage. Given that the firm's knowledge capital could be better proxied by other measures such as patent variables, I believe the main effect of R&D investment on capital structure lies in its tax credits. If this hypothesis is true, we would observe a negative relation between R&D investment and firm leverage while the relation between firm leverage and knowledge capital remains positive.
In the following example, I increase the firm's non debt tax shields, NTS , from 250 to 300(supposedly, it is caused by the increase in R&D expenditures). Numerical results show that as non debt tax credits increase, the firm's optimal debt level goes down correspondingly.
Panel A of figure 3 presents evidence on how non-debt tax credits affect the firm's optimal debt level. Clearly, we observe a negative relation. This result is consistent with previous studies conditional on that we are able to find better measures for the firm's knowledge capital that totally dominate R&D investment's role as a proxy for knowledge capital.
Numerical analysis enables me to further explore implications of the model. I first increase λ 1 from 0.1 to 0.2. λ 1 measures the impact of firm-specific knowledge capital on the likelihood and frequency of firm exercising growth options. As shown in Panel B of figure 3 , the higher quality of the firm's knowledge capital (measured by higher λ 1 ), the more likely that growth opportunities will be materialized. Therefore, the optimal debt level tends to be higher.
When I change the magnitude of σ Based on above numerical analysis, we develop the following hypotheses: 
Sample Selection
My analysis starts from 156 biotech firms that had gone public before 1992.
13 Among the 156 firms, I am able to find 129 companies that have records in the COMPUSTAT database.
I exclude the firm-year observations that correspond to a firm's first two appearances in the COMPUSTAT database.
My sample selection criteria limit my analysis to biotech firms only. While this approach enables me to economize on the time and cost for data collection, the conclusions of my analysis do not necessarily apply to other industries, especially non-high-tech industries.
Even though I believe my model is very general, its implications have to be accepted with reservation before they are fully supported by empirical evidence.
Variables for The Analysis of Leverage Level
In this subsection, I define the variables used in the empirical analysis.
Measure of Leverage
In this study, I measure the leverage level at the end of each fiscal year. Three different methods are used:
and Leverage3 = total liabilities total assets .
13 The firms I study here is a subset of the biotech companies collected by Lynne Zucker and Michael Darby for their on-going project on "Intellectual Human Capital, Technology Transfer, and the Organization of Leading-Edge Industries: The Case of Biotechnology". The initial database contains 751 biotech firms. In this study, I focus only on public firms due to the limitation of accessibility to accounting and other firm-specific information.
Leverage1 measures the firm's leverage based on book values. Leverage2 is based on market values. Leverage3 is the broadest definition of leverage. It can be viewed as a proxy
for what is left for shareholders in case of liquidation. However, it does not provide a good indication of whether the firm is at risk of default in the near future. Also, since total liabilities also includes such items like accounts payable, which may be used for transaction purposes rather than for financing, it may overstate the amount of leverage. In my analyses, I mainly rely on leverage1 and leverage2.
3.2.2.Measure of Knowledge Capital
The literature has been pretty settled on using patent data to measure a firm's knowledge capital. Compared to R&D investment, patent data capture the output of a firm's research projects. Therefore, it precisely measures a firm's knowledge base. Given that the distribution of private patent values is extremely skewed, the quality of patent counts as meaningful measure of knowledge capital is severely undermined. In this study, I use the number of future cites a patent receives and the number of a patent's claims to control the quality of a patent. I go to the US Patent and Trademark Office web page to search for patent information for biotech firms. For each firm, I record how many patents were applied in each year, how many claims each of them has (clm), and how many subsequent citations a patent receives since it is approved (cit). Define Cit(t,s) = number of cites received at time s to the patents applied for at time t; then Cit(t) = T s=t Cit(t, s)= total number of cites for the patents applied for at time t. Similarly, we define Clm(t) = total number of claims for the patents applied for at time t. Note that in our paper, T = 1997.
Assume a single depreciation rate for the value of a patent,δ. If I denote the firm's knowledge capital at time t as K(t), we have
Equation (23) is used to calculate a firm's knowledge capital at time t. If we use claims instead of citations, we have K1(t), whose definition is exactly the same as equation (23)except that claim counts are used. Here, I assume δ to be 0.2 in this study. The empirical results are not sensitive to the value of δ.
Other Control Variables
Previous empirical studies have identified a number of factors that are related to a firm's optimal financing decision. I need to control these variables in the empirical analysis.
A. Tangibility of Assets
Most theories on capital structure argue that the characteristics of assets affects a firm's leverage. E.g., if the tangibility of assets is higher, it is easier for the firm to liquidate the assets and recover their value. Therefore, a firm is more likely to use debt financing. In this study, I use two variables to measure a firm's asset tangibility: the ratio of intangible assets
to total assets (IN T /T A); and the ratio of inventory plus gross plant and equipment to total assets (IGP/T A).
We should observe INT/TA has negative relation with capital structure and IGP/TA has a positive sign.
B. Size
A number of authors have suggested that leverage are also related to firm size. 14 The argument is as follows: large firm is relatively more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy.
Therefore, large firm should be highly leveraged. In the empirical study, I use the natural logarithm of net sales, LSIZE, as the measure for firm size.
C. Uniqueness
Titman (1984) presents a model in which a firm's liquidation decision is causally linked to its bankruptcy status. As a result, the costs that a firm can potentially impose on its customers, suppliers, and workers by liquidating are relevant to its capital structure decisions.
Customers, workers, and suppliers of the firm that produces unique or specialized products probably suffer relatively higher costs when liquidating. Therefore, uniqueness is expected to be negatively related to debt ratios. I use selling, general and administrative expenses over total assets (SGA/TA) as the proxy for a firm's uniqueness.
D. Profitability
14 Warner, Ang, Chua, and McConnell (1982); Smith (1977) . Myers (1977) suggests that firms prefer raising capital, first from retained earnings, second from debt and third from issuing new equity. This may be due to the costs of issuing equity or due to asymmetric information discussed by Myers and Majluf (1984) . In either case, we should expect that the amount of earning available to be retained is an important determinant of a firm's capital structure. The more profitable a firm is, the less leveraged the firm will be. I use the ratio of operating income over sales (OI/S) as an indicator of profitability.
R&D investment is a key variable in my model. It captures a firm's non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, and knowledge capital. However, as I explained before, in presence of better measures for knowledge capital and growth opportunities, R&D investment mainly works as a measure for a firm's non-debt tax shields. I use the natural log of R&D expenditures (LRND) as the measure for R&D. I expect it to be negatively related to leverage. 
Results of Regressions
My sample includes 129 public biotech firms. I drop the firm-year observations that include missing values. This leaves me with 107 firms and 437 observations. Table 3 presents the OLS regression results. In regressions (1)- (3), I use the book value of leverage (leverage1) as the dependent variable. In regression (3), specifically, I adopt average leverage of a firm as the dependant variable. In regressions (4) and (5), the market value of leverage (leverage2) is used as dependant variable.
Considering the heterogeneity in firm size, I scale K(t) and K1(t) by total assets to capture a firm's knowledge capital(K/TA, K1/TA). This practice is consistent with Hall (1999). In the regressions, uniqueness variable, SGA/TA, is significantly negative. It confirms the findings in Titman (1984) : the more unique a firm's assets are, the less leveraged the firm will be. Size variable, LSIZE, is significantly positive, which implies that large firms are more likely to use debt financing. This is also consistent with previous studies. Without surprise, the sign of IGP/TA is positive. This demonstrates that a firm's asset tangibility positively relates to its leverage level. Surprisingly, INT/TA has positive sign and it is significant in some regressions. It may be due to the overlapping roles played by intangible with other variables meant to measure knowledge capital or non-debt tax shields. OI/S, the variable that captures a firm's profitability, is negative in all regressions. However, it is not significant. Consider the fact that most biotech firms in my sample are start-ups and do not have much operating income, it is not surprising this variable is not significant.
As shown in Table 2 , the average leverage for biotech firms is pretty low. I observe that about 20% firms do not have any debt in at least one time period. Given that, people may argue that OLS regressions may misspecify the relationship between firm leverage and explanatory variables. To address this concern, I apply TOBIT models. Table 4 presents the results of TOBIT regressions. Clearly, the story does not change and the significance of knowledge capital variables gets even stronger.
Based on empirical evidence, it is safe to argue that high-tech firm's knowledge stock indeed is a very important determinant of the firm's leverage. The empirical results also provide evidence on the roles played by R&D investment in the presence of better knowledge capital measures (Hypothesis 2). In this article, I do not endeavor to test hypothesis 3 since I do not have reliable measures for a firm's business risks. The variance of firm's operating incomes could be decomposed into two parts: one relates to the assets in place;
the other relates to its growth opportunities. However, it is hard to tell which is which in empirical experiments. Evidence from previous studies on capital structure, however, helps us understand this issue. E.g., Jaffe and Westerfield (1987) find a positive relation between business risks and optimal debt level; Castanias (1983) finds a negative relations between these two; Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991) identify a U-shape relation. Clearly, the evidence is inclusive. I believe failing to distinguish the two parts of risks that contribute to a firm's overall business risks may be responsible for the ambiguous relation between business risks and leverage.
The Analysis of Changes in Capital Structure
The key implication from my model is that once a firm's knowledge capital has been enhanced, it will increase its leverage. In this section, I design a test to see whether firm leverage changes significantly after the occurring of events that represent the enhancement of a firm's knowledge capital. Section 4.1 discusses the research methodology. Section 4.2.
presents the results of event study.
The Study Design
It is well known that high-tech firms are built upon technological innovations. Technological innovations dramatically enhance a firm's knowledge base. This, in turn, changes a firm's earning dynamics. Once a firm makes technological breakthrough, it normally will appear in the press. Thus, high-tech firm's technology related news announcements provide us with a unique opportunity to study how a firm's optimal financing decisions change as its knowledge base improves. Some announcements are dropped since they occurred in the year the firm first appeared in COMPUSTAT database. My strategy is based on the following logic: if a firm made some announcements in year t, the firm's knowledge capital was increased correspondingly in that year. In other words, the firm has successfully materialized its growth opportunities. Based on my model, the firm's leverage will increase. Therefore, by comparing the firm leverages in year t-1 and year t+1, I am able to know whether the firm's leverage level has increased due to the enhancement of its knowledge capital.
Results of The Event Study
The event period in this study is in terms of year. I only count it once if a firm makes multiple announcements in one given year. Thus I collect 306 event year. 16 For the 306 event year, I calculate a firm's leverage in year t-1 and in year t+1,and then compare them.
I use both t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test to test the hypothesis that the leverage in year t-1 is the same as the one in year t+1.
As Table 5 shows, if I choose leverage3 (total liabilities/total debt) as the measure for leverage, both t-test and Wilcoxon sign-rank test reject the hypothesis. It implies that the firm's leverage significantly increases in year t+1. When I choose leverage1 (total debt/total asset), the t-statistic is 2.3419, which rejects the hypothesis that the leverage level in year t-1 is the same as its level in year t+1 at 1.62% confidence level. The evidence from Wilcoxon signed-rank test is weaker, where p value is just about 0.3064. When I choose leverage2 (total debt/(total debt+market value)), the t-statistics is (p = 0.0355). Again, the result of t-test reject the hypothesis. The result from Wilcoxon sign-rank test is the basically the same.
Here, the Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic = 1.979 (p=0.0478), which rejects the hypothesis at 5% confidence level.
The evidence from time series study weakly confirms the main implication derived from the model: a firm with high knowledge capital will have high leverage. However, in the event study, I did not control other factors that may have caused the changes in firm leverage.
Given the fact that bio-tech firms are technology-oriented, I believe the result is reliable.
Conclusion
This paper studies high-tech firms' optimal capital structure under an R&D intensive and technologically innovative world. I investigate the interaction among firm leverage, growth opportunities, knowledge capital, and earning dynamics. By assuming a firm's earnings fol-16 On average, a biotech firm makes two technology-related announcements in one given year.
low a jump-diffusion process with jump intensity endogenously related to a firm's knowledge capital, I find the links between growth opportunities and knowledge capital. This enable me to further explore how they work together to determine a firm's optimal capital structure.
Due to the complexity brought along by the jump component, I am not able to solve the model analytically. However, numerical analyses yield several very interesting results:
• For reasonable parameter values, there is a positive relationship between a firm's knowledge capital and its optimal leverage. Firms with high knowledge base are expected to be highly levered, ceteris paribus. Note that knowledge capital in this article has very subtle meaning: it is different from R&D expenditures, or intangible assets per se. It is able to capture the technological innovation nature people have witnessed over the past two decades in high-tech industries. I believe the number of patent citations, number of firm's linkage to or affiliation with "star" scientists, etc., are good proxies for knowledge capital.
• As shown in previous studies, there exists a negative relationship between a firm's leverage and its R&D expenditures. Note that my argument is based on the tax credits enjoyed by a firm's R&D expenditures .
• My numerical analysis shows that the effects of business risks on firm leverage is ambiguous. Carefully designed study should distinguish the contributions of assets in place and potential growth opportunities to a firm's overall business risks. Using the variance or standard deviation of a firm's cash flows as the measure for business risk without disentangling the risks related to assets in place and growth opportunities may lead to false conclusion.
The results from the empirical study confirm the model implications. I find that firm leverage to be positively related to its knowledge capital measures. Also, I find that R&D expenditures have a negative influence on a firm's leverage level in the presence of other better measures for knowledge capital.
Last, I use event study approach to investigate how changes in a firm's knowledge capital affect a firm's capital structure. I find that firms normally increase their leverage subsequent to the increase in their knowledge capital.
In this study, I have assumed that a firm's knowledge capital is exogenously given when the firm optimizes it capital structure. A more realistic scenario is that the two decisions are made simultaneously. Endogenizing a firm's knowledge capital into the firm's optimal financing is on our future research agenda. Also, in this study, I have not explicitly model the effects of business risks on the firm's leverage. Future studies should try to disentangle the risks related to a firm's assets in place and the risks related to its growth opportunities.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that systematically explores the interaction among high-tech firm's knowledge capital, growth opportunities, earning dynamics and leverage. This study contributes to the literature on capital structure. It also provides an angle to understand the relation between a firm's assets in place and its growth opportunities, a challenging issue in current corporate finance research. 
Appendix: Proof to the Lemma in the text
The valuation partial differential equation (PDE) in main text can be rewritten as:
where we have applied the transformation L(t) = ln I(t). Inserting the following conjectured solution
into (A.1) produces the PDEs for the risk-neutralized probabilities, Π j , for j = 1, 2:
Equations (A.3) and (A.4) are the Fokker-Planck forward equations for probability functions.
This implies that Π 1 and Π 2 must indeed be valid probability functions, with values bounded between 0 and 1. These PDEs are separately solved subject to the terminal conditions . 5) where j = 1, 2. The corresponding characteristic functions for π 1 and π 2 will also satisfy similar PDFs:
subject to the terminal conditions
for j = 1, and2. Conjecture that the solutions to the PDEs (A.6) and (A.7) are respectively given by
with u(0) = y * (0) = 0 and z(0) = y x (0) = 0. By the separation of variable technique, we can solve the PDEs as follows:
Q.E.D. (20) hold. In the numerical analysis, I assume the following parameter values: non-debt tax shields, NTS = 250; mean operating income, I * = 1000; marginal corporate tax rate, τ C = 0.35; marginal personal income tax rate, τ P = 0.28; risk-free interest rate, R = 0.07;debt maturity, τ = 2; σ = 0.1; jump size, µ J = -0.1; dispersion of jump size, σ J 2 = 0.04; λ 0 = 0.1; knowledge capital related jump intensity, λ 1 = 0.1. t-test for the null hypothesis that the leverage levels are the same for year t-1 and year t+1: t-statistic = 2.7248; p-value = 0.0068. Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis that the medians of the leverages are the same for year t-1 and year t+1: P-value = 0.0012. 
